Does response time predict withdrawal decisions? Lessons from a bank-run experiment by Kiss, Hubert János et al.
    
 
MŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK                           DISCUSSION PAPERS  
 
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL STUDIES,  
HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES - BUDAPEST, 2018 
 
MT-DP – 2018/9 
 
 
 
 
Does response time predict withdrawal decisions? 
 
Lessons from a bank-run experiment 
 
 
HUBERT JÁNOS KISS  
ISMAEL RODRIGUEZ-LARA  
ALFONSO ROSA-GARCIA
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Discussion papers 
MT-DP – 2018/9 
 
Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies,  
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
 
KTI/IE Discussion Papers are circulated to promote discussion and provoque 
comments.  
Any references to discussion papers should clearly state that the paper is preliminary. 
Materials published in this series may subject to further publication. 
Does response time predict withdrawal decisions? 
Lessons from a bank-run experiment 
Authors: 
 
Hubert János Kiss  
Research fellow in the Momentum (LD-004/2010)  
Game Theory Research Group 
Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies,  
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
Department of Economics, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary.  
email: hubert.kiss@tatk.elte.hu 
Ismael Rodriguez-Lara  
Department of Economics, Middlesex University London, UK 
email: I.Rodriguez-Lara@mdx.ac.uk. 
Alfonso Rosa-Garcia 
Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y de la Empresa,  
Universidad Católica San Antonio, Murcia, Spain  
email: arosa@ucam.edu 
 
 
 
 
May 2018 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Does response time predict withdrawal decisions? 
Lessons from a bank-run experiment 
 
Hubert János Kiss – Ismael Rodriguez-Lara – Alfonso Rosa-Garcia 
 
Abstract  
 
We study how response time in a laboratory experiment on bank runs affects withdrawal 
decisions. In our setup, the bank has no fundamental problems, depositors decide equentially 
(if to keep the money in the bank or to withdraw) and may observe previous decisions 
depending on the information structure. We consider two levels of difficulty of decision-
making conditional on the presence of strategic dominance and strategic uncertainty. We 
posit that i) decisions in information sets characterized by the lack of strategic dominance are 
more difficult than in those with strategic dominance; ii) in the latter group, decisions are 
more difficult when there is strategic uncertainty. We investigate how response time 
associates with the difficulty and optimality of withdrawal decision. We hypothesize that a) 
the more difficult the decision, the longer the response time; b) the predictive power of 
response time depends on difficulty. We find that response time is longer in information sets 
with strategic uncertainty compared to those without (as expected), but we do not find such 
relationship when considering strategic dominance (contrary to our hypothesis). Response 
time correlates negatively with optimal decisions in information sets with a dominant 
strategy (contrary to our expectation) and also when decisions are obvious in the absence of 
strategic uncertainty (in line with our hypothesis). When there is strategic uncertainty, we 
find suggestive evidence that response time predicts optimal decisions. Thus, freezing 
deposits for some time may be beneficial and help to avoid massive withdrawals as it 
engthens response times.  
 
Keywords: bank run, cognitive abilities, coordination games, dominant strategy, 
experiment, response time, sequential rationality, strategic uncertainty 
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Előrejelzi a válaszidő a betétesi döntéseket?  
Egy bankroham-kísérlet tanulságai 
Kiss Hubert János – Ismael Rodriguez-Lara – Alfonso Rosa-Garcia 
Összefoglaló 
 
Egy laboratóriumi kísérlet segítségével azt tanulmányozzuk, hogyan hat a válaszidő a betétesi 
döntésekre. A kísérletben a banknak nincsenek fundamentális problémái, a betétesek egymás 
után döntenek, hogy kivegyék-e a pénzüket a bankból, és az információs struktúra 
függvényében megfigyelhetik az előző döntéseket. A döntéshozatal két nehézségi fokát 
vizsgáljuk, amelyeket a domináns stratégiák, illetve a stratégiai bizonytalanság jelenléte 
okoznak. Azt várjuk, hogy i) nehezebb dönteni akkor, amikor nincs domináns stratégia; ii) 
amikor van domináns stratégia, akkor a döntés stratégiai bizonytalanság mellett nehezebb, 
mint annak hiányában. A következő hipotéziseket fogalmazzuk meg a válaszidő hossza és a 
betétesi döntések nehézségével és optimalitásával kapcsolatban: a) minél nehezebb a döntés, 
annál hosszabb a válaszidő; b) a válaszidő prediktív ereje a nehézségtől függ. Azt találjuk, 
hogy a válaszidő hosszabb olyan domináns stratégiával rendelkező döntési helyzetekben, 
amelyeket stratégiai bizonytalanság jellemez (ahogy vártuk), de nem találunk összefüggést a 
válaszidő és a domináns stratégia jelenléte között (szemben a várakozásainkkal). A válaszidő 
negatívan korrelál az optimális döntésekkel olyan döntési helyzetekben, amelyekben van 
domináns stratégia (várakozásainkkal ellentétben) és akkor is, amikor a döntés nyilvánvaló a 
stratégiai bizonytalanság hiányában (ahogy vártuk). Stratégiai bizonytalanság mellett 
meggyőző bizonyítékot találunk amellett, hogy a válaszidő előrejelzi az optimális döntéseket. 
A betétkifizetések felfüggesztése így hasznos lehet, hogy elkerüljük a tömeges betétkivétet, 
hiszen ez megnöveli a válaszidőt. 
 
Kulcsszavak: bankroham, domináns stratégia, kísérlet, kognitív képességek, koordinációs 
játék, stratégiai bizonytalanság, válaszidő 
JEL kódok: C72, C91, D80, G21 
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Abstract
We study how response time in a laboratory experiment on bank runs
affects withdrawal decisions. In our setup, the bank has no fundamen-
tal problems, depositors decide sequentially (if to keep the money in the
bank or to withdraw) and may observe previous decisions depending on
the information structure. We consider two levels of difficulty of decision-
making conditional on the presence of strategic dominance and strategic
uncertainty. We posit that i) decisions in information sets characterized
by the lack of strategic dominance are more difficult than in those with
strategic dominance; ii) in the latter group, decisions are more difficult
when there is strategic uncertainty. We investigate how response time
associates with the difficulty and optimality of withdrawal decision. We
hypothesize that a) the more difficult the decision, the longer the response
time; b) the predictive power of response time depends on difficulty. We
find that response time is longer in information sets with strategic uncer-
tainty compared to those without (as expected), but we do not find such
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relationship when considering strategic dominance (contrary to our hy-
pothesis). Response time correlates negatively with optimal decisions in
information sets with a dominant strategy (contrary to our expectation)
and also when decisions are obvious in the absence of strategic uncer-
tainty (in line with our hypothesis). When there is strategic uncertainty,
we find suggestive evidence that response time predicts optimal decisions.
Thus, freezing deposits for some time may be beneficial and help to avoid
massive withdrawals as it lengthens response times.
Keywords: bank run, cognitive abilities, coordination games, domi-
nant strategy, experiment, response time, sequential rationality, strategic
uncertainty
JEL Classification: C72, C91, D80, G21.
1 Introduction
There were numerous bank runs during the last financial crisis that started in
2007 with the run on Northern Rock, an English bank. Run-like phenomena
affected also money-market, hedge and pension funds (Baba, McCauley and
Ramaswamy, 2009), the repo market (Gorton and Metrick, 2012) and even bank
lending (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). Hence, understanding the nature of
bank runs would help to prevent the unfolding of such events in all these settings
in the future.
Descriptions of real bank runs illustrate how depositors rush to the bank,
often trying to withdraw their money as fast as possible. This situation cre-
ates the queues in front of the banks that have become a symbol of economic
and financial crisis. However, existing studies have not delved into the rela-
tion between bank run situations and the speed of decision-making. Moreover,
nothing is known about if (too) fast responses are related to the emergence of
bank run-like situations. This study investigates these questions with an exper-
imental approach, analyzing the relation between response time and withdrawal
decisions of different difficulty that can provoke or spread a bank run.
When a bank run is underway and depositors rush to the bank to withdraw
their funds, the banking authority responds in many instances by suspending
the convertibility (also known as freezing the deposits). Such a suspension has
many roles, one of which is to allow to make more informed and less hurried
decisions. If in a fundamentally healthy bank a run is caused by panicky and
hastened decisions that moreover turn out to be contagious, then the imposed
suspension may help to stop the massive withdrawal. Our study can be seen as
an indirect test to see in a controlled environment if panicky decisions result in
withdrawals and bank runs.
Our laboratory framework resembles a situation where bank runs may occur
under different circumstances. In particular, in our framework there is an impa-
tient depositor who withdraws immediately and there are two patient depositors
who decide whether to withdraw or to keep the money deposited. Depositors
take their decisions in different information structures, that vary according to
the decisions that can be observed.1 In our experimental model, bank runs may
1It resembles different types of situations: in some cases depositors decide in a physical
queue so they observe actions of their predecessors, in other cases depositors completely ignore
what other depositors are doing (e.g. in case of online banking). The run on Northern Rock
is an illustration of the first case, while the ’silent run’ on Washington Mutual exemplifies the
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occur only due to coordination problems between depositors and potentially
those coordination problems arise due to hurried and not sufficiently premedi-
tated decisions. If both patient depositors keep their funds deposited, then it
gives them the largest payoff, and leads to the social optimum of no bank run.
However, if only one of them does so, then withdrawal yields a larger payoff
(except for the last position, as we explain later) and there is a bank run.
When depositors make decisions during a bank run, there are different sit-
uations that imply different cognitive load. We assume that decision-making
is easiest when there is a dominant strategy and at the same time there is no
strategic uncertainty (that is uncertainty about the choices of the other deposi-
tors). Things are more difficult if there is dominant strategy, but also strategic
uncertainty. The set of decisions that we consider the most difficult in our setup
are those that have no dominant strategy. We study if response time varies with
the difficulty of the decision-making. We conjecture that response time is longer
in information sets where decision-making is more difficult. In other words, we
hypothesize that on average response time i) is shorter when subjects have a
dominant strategy than when there is not such a strategy, and ii) when there is
a dominant strategy, response time is longer when there is strategic uncertainty
relative to when there is not.
The quality of decisions associated to different response times may also have
a key importance in bank run situations. Thus, we also explore how response
time correlates with the decision of keeping the funds deposited or withdrawing
the money from the bank. We expect that when there is a dominant strategy
and no strategic uncertainty, then response time has no predictive power be-
cause decision-making is very straightforward and not much mental effort and
deliberation is needed to find the optimal choice. In this case, actually longer
response time may be seen as a signal of not understanding the situation. How-
ever, as decisions become more difficult, response time may have an explanatory
power. More precisely, we speculate that in information sets with strategic un-
certainty and with a dominant strategy longer response time may go together
with better decisions. If this is the case, it would suggest that faster decisions
can be associated with poor financial decisions that can lead to runs in banks
with no fundamental problems.
Suboptimal decisions may lead to considerable economic losses.2 A straight-
forward explanation of suboptimal decision-making is that real-life individuals
do not act as rationally as the homo oeconomicus in the standard economic
models. Potentially, the reason is that cognitive abilities are in shorter supply
than the theory assumes. In fact, there is a growing literature that studies how
cognitive abilities relate to financial decision-making (e.g. Korniotis and Kumar
2010).3 In this study we control in regressions for cognitive abilities (measured
second case.
2There are numerous examples that potentially are due to poor financial decision making.
For instance, Gerardi et al. (2013) claim that mortgage defaults in the US housing market
that propelled the last economic downturn were associated with numerical ability. In the case
of retirement plans, Choi et al. (2011) and van Rooij et al. (2011) present evidence showing
that individuals forego arbitrage profits by making suboptimal investment choices. Bertrand
and Morse (2011) point out that some individuals do not collect sufficient information (even
though relevant information is available) about the real costs of the loan from payday lenders,
and take up extremely expensive loans from them.
3We show in an earlier study (Kiss et al., 2016) that cognitive abilities in fact affect
decision-making in a bank-run experiment.
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by the Cognitive Reflection Test, see Frederick (2005)), so we can investigate
if beyond cognitive abilities the length of the response time correlates with the
optimality of decisions.4
In our data, we find that response time does not vary with strategic domi-
nance. We do find support for our hypothesis regarding the effect of strategic un-
certainty: response time is longer in information sets with strategic uncertainty
than in information sets without it. Regarding the relationship between re-
sponse time and the optimality of depositor decisions, in the absence of strategic
uncertainty decisions response time associates negatively with optimal choices,
indicating that those who take longer to decide seemingly do not understand the
situation and make bad decisions. However, when there is some difficulty in the
decision (that in our case is equivalent to have an environment with strategic
uncertainty), then we have suggestive evidence that response time is positively
related with optimal decisions. This lends support to deposit freezes because
this can be seen as a way to lengthen the response time and so lead to better
decisions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the lit-
erature review. In section 3, first we present the experimental setup, then we
describe our hypotheses. We report our findings in section 4. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Literature review
Our study relates to two strands of literature: bank runs and response time.
Regarding bank runs, we are not aware of any paper that investigates how the
response time measured in experiments is associated with the difficulty and the
optimality of decisions. We hope that our study will spark more interest on
this issue. We review here briefly the role of strategic uncertainty in bank run
models and experiments. In the canonical Diamond-Dybvig (1983) framework
there are multiple equilibria, one of them involving bank run, because depositors
best respond to belief about the other depositors’ choices. Hence, one may argue
that pervasive strategic uncertainty in the form of a simultaneoues-move game
is behind that result.5 We have a sequential model in the sense that depending
on the underlying social network depositors have the opportunity to observe
previous decisions and it should alleviate the problem. Kiss et al. (2014a)
show in the same environment as we have in this paper that if depositors in
position 1 and 2 are linked, then theoretically we should not have bank runs in
equilibrium. However, in the lab they observe bank runs, so it is of interest to
see if the absence of strategic uncertainty and the time taken to decide affect if
a patient depositor withdraws. That is what we do in this paper.
In fact, the fast-growing literature on response time analysis in experimental
economics suggests that researchers should pay more attention to this under-
used additional variable that is available at zero cost in most lab experiments.
Economists ignored response time, even though psychologists started to measure
thinking time quite early (e.g. Donders 1868). Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2017)
4Jimenez et al. (2018) show that response time correlates positively with the Cognitive
Reflection Test.
5Kinateder and Kiss (2014) show that if the game is completely sequential and all previous
decisions can be observed, then the run equilibrium disappears.
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argue convincingly that the reason for it was the substantive (or outcome-based)
rationality paradigm proposed by many mainstream economists (for example,
Friedman 1953) that claims that the optimal choice of an individual given her
goals and constraints can be derived independently of the decision-making pro-
cess (of which time may be an important ingredient). In contrast, proponents
of procedural (or process-based) rationality (e.g. Simon 1976) assert the impor-
tance of decision-making processes and associated constraints. Many arguments
can be brought up in defence of using response time to understand decision-
making. Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2017) claim for instance that ecological
and external validity of experiments is harmed by neglecting response time.
Moreover, there may be a trade-off between response time and the optimality
of decision.
Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2017) review the existing literature and show
that the studies in which response time was measured and used as explana-
tory variable utilized mainly well-known games: ultimatum game, public-goods
game, dictator game and the p-beauty contest. We contribute to the literature
by considering a new game: the bank-run game, that is essentially a coordina-
tion game with two types. In the literature, in many instances response time is
significantly associated with choices, outcomes and payoffs. For example, Arad
and Rubinstein (2012) find that longer response time correlates with higher
average payoffs in an experiment using the Colonel Blotto game. Rand et al.
(2012) and Lotito et al. (2013) report that response time and contribution in the
public-goods game are negatively related. This suggests that cooperation is an
intuitive choice and longer thinking leads to more selfish decisions.6 Piovesan
and Wengstro¨m (2009) find that lower response time correlates with selfish
choices in the dictator game. Rubinstein (2007) shows that shorter response
time is related with more intuitive choices and less sophisticated reasoning in
different games and reports considerable heterogeneity in response time across
individuals. Rubinstein (2013) reports that in the case of non-strategic tasks
with an objective correct answer, the longer is the response time, the less errors
are commited.
Related to this last example, one of the most basic question is if there is a
trade-off between the speed and the optimality of the response. To be able to
come up with an answer to this question, one needs to have clear correct and
erroneous choices. Fortunately, in our bank-run game a patient depositor has
a dominant strategy in many information sets. For example, given the payoffs
it is clearly optimal to keep the money in the bank whenever another depositor
has decided to do so and her decision is observable. Moreover, as argued before,
even if there is a dominant strategy, in the presence of strategic uncertainty a
more sophisticated strategic reasoning is required, so there we expect that it may
take longer to reach the optimal decision. In information sets with a dominant
strategy, but without strategic uncertainty, decisions are simple, there quick
decisions may not imply errors.
Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2017) claim that it is important to thoroughly
map the speed-optimality relationship for classes of strategic games. Knowing
in which class of games is the trade-off present would inform for instance the
design of institutions. Our contribution in this respect is clear as we study
6Tingho¨g et al. (2013) claim that this finding does not hold when taking into account
subjects who did not answer on time. When correcting for these individuals, there is no clear
relationship between contribution levels and response time.
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a coordination game with and without strategic dominance and strategic un-
certainty, a class of game that - to the best of our knowledge - has not been
investigated from the vantage point of response time.
Another relevant piece of research is Rubinstein (2016) that proposes a ty-
pology of players based on the classification of their actions as instinctive or
contemplative.7 Importantly, classification is based on response time, contem-
plative / instinctive players take more / less time to respond than the median
response time. The use of response time to classify choices as instinctive or con-
templative is related to Kahneman (2011) who distinguishes between system I
decision processes (quick and instinctive responses) and system II decision pro-
cesses (deliberated and contemplative responses).8 Rubinstein gathered data on
response time for games played on his website from online players all over the
world. He analyzes 10 games i) that were played by many players, ii) that ex-
hibited very different response time distributions for the various actions, iii) for
which strategies could be classified clearly as being above or below the median
response time. The games included the zero-sum game, Hoteling’s Main Street
Game, the two-contests game, relying on the other player’s rationality, succesive
elimination, the ultimatum game, the one-shot chain store game, the centipede
game, the stop or pass game and the traveler’s dilemma. Choosing the safe /
dominated action generally was associated with shorter response time. Impor-
tantly, Rubinstein (2016) did not study coordination games with two types, so
in this sense our paper is a contribution to the literature. One may wonder,
what is the instinctive / contemplative action in our case? In the absence of
strategic uncertainty, the choice is simple so there it is not so important the dis-
tinction. When strategic uncertainty is present (when nothing / a withdrawal
is observed), then withdrawing seems to be the instinctive (and seemingly safe)
action.
Branas-Garza et al. (2016) is the closest study to ours, because they investi-
gate how strategic risk (that is equivalent to strategic uncertainty) and response
time interact. They use a game with high (ultimatum game) and low (Yes-or-No
game) strategic risk to disentangle the effects. They consider response time as a
proxy for the amount of deliberation. They find a positive correlation between
strategic risk and response time, a result that we share. They also report that
the choices of participants with a longer response time is more dispersed than
those of subjects with a shorter response time. They find that longer response
time associates with less giving in the ultimatum game (which is a more selfish,
but also a riskier behavior), while in the Yes-or-No game longer response time
correlates with more generous behavior. A clear difference between their study
and ours is that very different games are used and it has further consequences.
For instance, while in the ultimatum game it is not clear what is the optimal
choice (as the participant cannot know the minimum amount that her co-player
is willing to accept), in our game we often have a dominant strategy. Relat-
edly, while our participants face strategic uncertainty in many instances, still
they may have a dominant strategy. We show that strategic uncertainty affects
decisions even if it should not.9
7An individual’s type is then given as the probability of choosing the contemplative action.
8Note that slower decisions tend to be contemplative, but the fast-slow dimension is dif-
ferent from the instinctive-contemplative dimension.
9In our setup strategic uncertainty only makes the decision more complicated, without
altering the optimal choice.
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3 Experimental design and hypotheses
3.1 Experimental setup
Two sessions were run at the LINEEX (University of Valencia) in June 2013
using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). There was a total of 60 partici-
pants, all undergraduate Economics or Business students of the university who
have not taken part in experiments about coordination problems or financial
decisions before.
The experiment started with 3 trial rounds so that subjects become familiar
with the software and then 15 payoff-relevant rounds followed.10 At the begin-
ning of each round, each participant was informed that she had been randomly
matched to another participant in the lab, and together with a third depositor
(the impatient depositor who was simulated by the computer) they formed a
bank.
Each round consists of three periods t = {0, 1, 2}. Depositors start in (t = 0)
with their initial endowment of 80 ECUs deposited in the bank that hence has
240 ECUs. This amount is invested in a project that returns a certain net
positive return after two periods (t = 2), so there is no fundamental uncertainty
about the health of the bank. At t = 1 the investment can be liquidated without
any cost and yielding zero net return.
The computer determines randomly a sequence of decision at t = 1. Im-
portantly, depositors know their position in the sequence. We call depositor i
(i = 1, 2, 3) the depositor who decides in position i. Depositors have to decide
if to withdraw their money from the bank or to keep it deposited. Table 1
represents the payoffs. Withdrawal yields 100 ECUs immediately as long as the
bank has sufficient funds to pay. Therefore, if depositors 1 or 2 withdraw, then
each of them receives 100 ECUs with certainty. However, if depositor 3 chooses
to withdraw after two withdrawals, then her payoff is only 40 ECUs, because
the previous two depositors received a total of 200 ECUs from the bank, that
has only 40 ECUs left available.11
Table 1: Payoffs in the experiment, depending on the decision of other depositors
in the same bank
The payoff corresponding to keeping the money deposited depends on how
many depositors decide to do so. If there is only one depositor who does not
withdraw at t = 1, then her payoff amounts to 60 ECUs. If two depositors keep
their money in the bank, then their payoff is 140 ECUs.12
10We reproduce the instructions in Appendix A. More details on the game can be found in
Kiss et al. (2016).
11Note that if depositor 3 withdraws after 0 or 1 withdrawal, then the bank can pay her
100 ECUs.
12The payoffs reflect the payoffs in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in that payoff at t = 1 is
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Information about previous choices depends on the information structure
that is determined by a set of links among depositors. Link ij for i, j ∈
{1, 2, 3}, i < j implies that depositor j observes depositor i and depositor i
is aware of that fact. For instance, 13 denotes that depositor 1 and depositor
3 are connected; therefore, depositor 1 knows that depositor 3 will observe her
choice and that depositor 3 decides after observing depositor 1’s choice. Links
are independent of liquidity types (patient vs. impatient), so depositors of the
same type are not more likely to be linked, nor is there any relationship between
types and the number of links. Position and the number of links are also in-
dependent (e.g., depositors in position 1 do not have systematically more links
that subsequent depositors). We varied the information structure across rounds
in an exogenous way. All this information was made clear to the participants
at the beginning of the experiment.
Remember that in each bank there is a depositor (simulated by the com-
puter) who is hit by a liquidity shock at t = 1 and is forced to withdraw,
substantially increasing the degree of strategic uncertainty. Imagine a patient
depositor who observes a withdrawal. She does not know whether the with-
drawal is due to the impatient depositor (i.e., the computer) or a patient depos-
itor (i.e., the other subject in the lab) who chose to withdraw. In a similar vein,
when nothing can be observed, a depositor faces strategic uncertainty, because
she does not know what the other participant in the lab has decided / is going
to do.
Subjects in both sessions were split into three matching groups of 10. At the
beginning of each round, subjects within the same matching group were ran-
domly matched in pairs, and participants from different matching groups never
interacted with each other. Participants were informed about what happened
in their bank (the number of withdrawals and their own payoffs) before being
rematched.
For each decision, participants had 30 seconds to respond. Within that
time interval subjects could choose when to respond, so our study belongs to
the endogenous response time literature. If the participant did not respond on
time, then actually they could take more time for decision. The experimenters
nudged subtly the participants to the next round only in extreme cases when
one or some participant(s) took too much time to decide.
Socio-demographics were collected at the end of the experiment as part of
a questionnaire. It included questions regarding gender, risk aversion and cog-
nitive abilities. We used the investment decision in Gneezy and Potters (1997)
to elicit risk attitudes. Subjects were asked how much from a hypothetical en-
dowment of 10 Euros they would invest in a risky option and how much they
would keep. With 50% probability the investment returned 2.5 times the in-
vested amount, with 50% the investment was lost. The money not invested
in the risky option increased the earnings of the participant. Note that the ex-
pected value of the investment is positive and increasing in the amount invested;
higher than the initial deposit and that payoff at t = 2 gives the maximum payoff if all patient
depositor keep their funds deposited. That the last depositor has a dominant strategy to keep
her money in the bank is also a consequence of the Diamond-Dybvig setup (and therefore,
this feature is present in general in many bank-run model based on their seminal paper). In
this setup, the money that has not been withdrawn from the bank early earns some interest
as it matures. Thus, even if everybody has withdrawn and the bank still has some money left,
it is worthwhile to keep that money deposited instead of withdrawing because of the interest
accrued.
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therefore a risk-neutral (or risk-loving) participant would invest the 10 Euros,
while a risk-averse subject would invest less. Risk aversion can be proxied by
the amount not invested in the risky asset.13 We used the Cognitive Reflection
Test by Frederick (2005) to measure cognitive abilities.
Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes, and average payoff amounted
to 15 euros, including a show-up fee of 3 euros. A random lottery incentive
procedure was used for the payment, thus one choice (that is, one of the rounds)
was randomly paid at the end of the experiment. We used the exchange rate 10
ECUs = 1 euro.
3.2 Hypotheses
We state hypotheses relating the length of response time with the cognitive
difficulty that characterizes the decisions, and with the optimality of depositor
decisions. We argue that we can group decisions conditional on the presence of
strategic dominance and strategic uncertainty. Our first hypothesis is related to
the information sets with and without dominant strategies. Given the payoffs
(see Table 1), in all information sets in position 3 a patient depositor has a
dominant strategy. This is the case, because given the payoffs in that situation
keeping the money in the bank is the best strategy, for any possible action of
the other patient depositor. At position 2, a patient depositor has a dominant
strategy to keep her money in the bank if she observes that depositor 1 did the
same, because that gives the maximum payoff. In all other information sets,
optimality of strategies depends on actions of the rest of depositors, thus there is
no dominant strategy. We conjecture that decisions in information sets without
a dominant strategy are more difficult than those with a dominant (and hence
straightforward) strategy, and thus we hypothesize longer response times.
Hypothesis 1a - Strategic dominance and response time: We expect
to observe longer response times in information sets without dominant strategy
than in information sets with dominant strategy.
In our bank-run enviroment, situations with a dominant strategy may have
or not have strategic uncertainty, defined as the uncertainty regarding the choice
of the other patient depositor. For instance, if a patient depositor in position
3 observes a withdrawal, then she faces strategic uncertainty as the observed
choice can be due either to the patient or the impatient depositor. However,
she has a dominant strategy, as explained earlier. In contrast, if a patient
depositor observes that somebody decided to keep her money in the bank, then
she knows with certainty what the other patient depositor did and it makes her
decision easier. We hypothesize that decision is more difficult in information
sets characterized by strategic uncertainty, and as before we propose that on
average depositors need more time to decide in those information sets.
Hypothesis 1b - Strategic uncertainty and response time: In infor-
mation sets with a dominant strategy, we expect to observe on average longer
response times in information sets with strategic uncertainty than in information
sets without strategic uncertainty.
13Crosetto and Filippin (2016) review four risk elicitation methods, among them also the
one used by us.
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Now we propose hypotheses regarding the effect of response time on opti-
mality of decisions. In the information sets with a dominant strategy, we test
if longer deliberation is associated with better decisions, which in this situation
means to keep the funds in the bank.
Hypothesis 2a - Response time and optimal decisions when there is
a dominant strategy: In information sets with a dominant strategy, we expect
a positive correlation between response time and the probability of keeping the
money deposited.
In an information set with a dominant strategy and no strategic uncertainty,
the decision is obvious. In this case, we consider that a longer response time
should be more related with confusion. When there is strategic uncertainty, we
can expect that longer response time are associated with a higher deliberation
in finding it.
Hypothesis 2b - Response time and optimal decisions conditional
on strategic uncertainty: In information sets with a dominant strategy, we
expect longer response times to associate with optimal decisions in the presence
of strategic uncertainty. When strategic uncertainty is absent, we expect no or
negative correlation between response times and decisions.
4 Results
Subjects in the experiment took their decision on keeping their funds deposited
or withdrawal under different circumstances. In Table 2 and in Table 3 we show
the response times and depositor decisions aggregated at the individual level (for
each individual, we take the average in each condition, and compare between
individuals). As Table 2 shows, response time is very similar with or without a
dominant strategy. Individuals who keep their money deposited seem to decide
in less time. Table 3 indicates that response time and withdrawal decisions vary
much more with respect to the presence of strategic uncertainty.
Table 2: Response times in information sets with and without dominant strategy
In what follows, we analyze first the response time of subjects depending
on the presence of strategic dominance and strategic uncertainty. We plot the
cumulative distribution functions for information sets where they are or are
not present, and test differences using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. We also
compare aggregated choices at the individual level using the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test.
Then we move to the effects of response time on withdrawal decisions. First,
we compare response times of individuals deciding whether to keep the money
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Table 3: Response times in information sets with and without strategic uncer-
tainty
in the bank or to withdraw, using the same procedure than before. Then we add
response time as a explanatory variable of withdrawal decision in a regression
model where we control for individual characteristics.
4.1 Strategic dominance, strategic uncertainty and response
time
4.1.1 Strategic dominance
Participants in the experiment were reasonable in the sense that in information
sets with a dominant strategy (to keep the money in the bank) there are only
9.3% withdrawals. In information sets without the dominant strategy of keeping
the funds deposited the withdrawal rate climbs up to 39.6%.
Hypothesis 1a says that decision in information sets without a dominant
strategy is more difficult, so it takes longer to choose in these circumstances.
In fact, the average response time corresponding to when there is no dominant
strategy (19.67) is longer than when there is (18.83). Note these numbers are
the averages of all decisions, without taking into account who made that choice.
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution function of response time in informa-
tion sets with and without dominant strategy. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
detects a weak difference (p-value=0.095) between the two distributions.
Table 2 aggregates observations on the individual level. It shows that the
average response time is somewhat longer when there is dominant strategy, but
the difference is rather small. In fact, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test does not
indicate a significant difference (p-value=0.7460). All these evidence drives us
to reject Hypothesis 1a.
Result 1a - Strategic dominance and response time: We do not
observe longer response times in information sets without dominant strategy
than in information sets with dominant strategy, thus we reject Hypothesis 1a.
Result 1a may indicate that forming beliefs about the other patient deposi-
tor’s choice may be easier for participants in the lab than figure out that they
are in an information set with a dominant strategy, and hence they have an
obvious choice. In fact, there are studies documenting that many subjects find
it hard in experiments to reason case-by-case and come up with best responses
to hypothetical events (e.g. Shafir and Tversky 1992, Esponda and Vespa 2014,
Ngangoue and Weizsacker 2015). That is, even though the dominant strat-
egy theoretically seems to make decision easy, finding it may be a cognitively
demanding task. This implies that potentially there is some heterogeneity in
11
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution function of response times in information sets
with and without dominant strategy
the difficulty of decisions within the information sets with a dominant strategy,
showing that it makes sense to study the difficulty of decisions along another
dimension, for instance strategiy uncertainty.
4.1.2 Strategic uncertainty
Regarding the effect of strategic uncertainty, participants in the experiment
on average made rational choices because in information sets with a dominant
strategy and without strategic uncertainty we observe only 3.3% withdrawals.
In information sets with a dominant strategy, but also with strategic uncertainty
the withdrawal rate rises to 17.1%.
Hypothesis 1b conjectures that within the set of information sets with dom-
inant strategy it is more difficult to decide when there is strategic uncertainty,
so we should observe longer response times in information sets with strategic
uncertainty.
If we just pool all decisions without considering who made the decision, then
the average response time corresponding to when there is no strategic uncer-
tainty (17) is longer than when there is (21.25). Figure 2 shows the cumulative
distribution function of response time in information sets with and without
strategic uncertainty. Visual inspection shows easily discernible differences in-
dicating that response times are shorter in absence of strategic uncertainty.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test detects a significant difference (p-value=0.008)
between the two distributions.
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 aggregate observations on the individual
level. It shows that average response time is considerably longer when there is
strategic uncertainty. In fact, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates a signifi-
cant difference (p-value=0.037).
Overall, the previous results show strong evidence in favour of Hypothesis
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution function of response times with and without
strategic uncertainty when there is dominant strategy
1b, indicating that when considering strategic uncertainty the difficulty of the
decision is associated with response time in information sets with a dominant
strategy.
Result 1b - Strategic uncertainty and response time: We focus on
information sets with a dominant strategy. In information sets with strategic
uncertainty response time is longer than in information sets without strategic
uncertainty, thus we cannot reject Hypothesis 1b.
4.2 Response time and depositor decision
Hypothesis 2a proposes that response time should correlate positively with op-
timal decisions in the information sets with dominant strategy. We find that
subjects who optimally decided to keep the money in the bank needed on aver-
age 18.29 seconds to do so, while those who withdrew needed 24.15 seconds. The
cumulative distribution function of response time in information sets with dom-
inant strategy in Figure 3 confirms that those who decide to keep the money
in the bank do so in less time than those who withdraw. According to the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test the difference is significant (p-value=0.043).
When decisions are aggregated on the individual level (see Table 2), we see
the same pattern as with the pooled data.14 That is, those who chose optimally
(and kept their funds in the bank) actually needed less time to make up there
mind. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test reveals that the difference is not significant
(p-value=0.6417).
14The number of observations depends on how many of the 60 participants chose at least
once to keep her funds depositied / withdraw with or without dominant strategy. For instance,
N=17 in column 2 indicates that there were 17 participants who in information sets with
dominant strategy chose to withdraw.
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution function of response times of withdrawal
decisions with a dominant strategy
This evidence suggests that shorter response times associate with the (cor-
rect) decision of keeping the money in the bank when the decision is straightfor-
ward. We consider now two regressions represented in Table 4. We estimate a
logit model in which the dependent variable is if the depositor withdraws (deci-
sion=1) or not (decision=0). The main explanatory variable in both regressions
is response time that measures the seconds elapsed before the participant chose.
In the first regression we consider information sets with and without dominant
strategy and the dummy Dominant strategy shows if there is one. As our hy-
pothesis formulates the potential interplay between strategic dominance and the
effect of response time, we have also an interaction term (Resp. time * Dom.
Strat.). In the second regression we only focus on the information sets with
dominant strategy.
Since subjects played 15 rounds and they may be affected by the experience
they had in previous rounds, we define the variable History as the percentage
of previous rounds in which the subject observed the other patient depositor
withdrawing.15 We also control by the variables in the questionnaire (cognitive
abilities, gender and risk aversion).
The estimated standard errors in parentheses are corrected using the Bias
Reduced Linearization (see Bell and McCaffrey (2002)) and control for matching
group clustering. We report the marginal effects.
15Since the study by Garratt and Keister (2009), it is standard to control for experience in
previous rounds.
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(1) (2)
Pooled data Dominant strategy
VARIABLES Marginal effects Marginal effects
Response time 0.00234*** 0.00169***
(0.000819) (0.000642)
Dominant strategy -0.327***
(0.0664)
Resp. time * Dom. strat. 0.00141
(0.00254)
Cognitive abilities 0.0143 -0.0170
(0.0346) (0.0259)
Female 0.0248 0.0115
(0.0925) (0.0380)
Risk aversion -0.000651 -0.00251
(0.0332) (0.0182)
History -0.0515 -0.164
(0.135) (0.124)
Observations 900 367
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Regression analysis of the effect of response times on withdrawal deci-
sions with a dominant strategy
In the first regression, the effect of response time is positive and significant,
suggesting that overall longer response time leads to more withdrawals. How-
ever, being in an information set with a dominant strategy has a significant and
negative effect, in line with the descriptive statistics that shows that partici-
pants were less likely to withdraw when there was a dominant strategy relative
to when there was no (22.4% vs. 46.2%). The interaction term is not signifi-
cant, indicating that response time does not have a different effect depending
on being in an information set with dominant strategy. When considering only
decisions in information sets with dominant strategy, the effect of response time
does not have the expected sign, and moreover it is significant. Therefore, longer
response time tends to lead to worse decisions, ceteris paribus. The rest of the
variables does not have a significant effect.
Result 2a: We do not observe a positive correlation between response time
and optimal decisions in information sets with dominant strategy. In fact, the
opposite holds. Thus, we reject Hypothesis 2a.
Hypothesis 2b relates response time and optimal decisions when there is or
is not strategic uncertainty. With strategic uncertainty, longer response time
should correlate positively with optimal decisions. However, when there is no
strategic uncertainty, longer response time may just indicate confusion and re-
sult in suboptimal choice.
Using pooled data, in the absence of strategic uncertainty, decisions of keep-
ing the money in the bank took on average 16.28 seconds, while withdrawals
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needed 37.74 seconds. The cumulative distribution function of response time in
information sets without strategic uncertainty in Figure 4 confirms that keeping
the money in the bank required less time than withdrawing. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test indicates that the difference is significant (p-value=0.003).
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Figure 4: Cumulative distribution function of response times of withdrawal
decisions without strategic uncertainty
If decisions are aggregated on the individual level (see Table 3), the same
pattern as with the pooled data is observed. That is, those who chose optimally
(and kept their funds in the bank) actually needed a lot (about 50%) less time
to make up their mind. Despite the sizable difference, the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test fails to detect a significant difference (p-value=0.1797), possibly due
to the fact that there were only 3 participants who withdrew at least once in
information sets with a dominant strategy and without strategic uncertainty.
Turning to the case with strategic uncertainty, decisions of keeping funds
deposited took on average 21.38 seconds to do so which is somewhat longer
than the 20.63 seconds needed by withdrawals. Figure 5 shows the cumulative
distribution function corresponding to these cases. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test does not detect any significant difference (p-value=0.8).
When considering the data aggregated on the individual level, again we ob-
serve that on average finding the optimal decision took more time than choosing
the suboptimal alternative, in line with Hypothesis 2b. However, the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test fails to detect a significant difference (p-value=0.2209).
Table 5 shows the results of a logit model estimation where the dependent
variable is if the depositor withdraws or not. The main explanatory variable is
response time, and we control also by cognitive abilities, gender, risk aversion
and history. In the first regression we consider information sets both with and
without strategic uncertainty and the dummy Strat. uncert. indicates in which
one we are. As our hypothesis formulates a potential interplay between strategic
uncertainty and the effect of response time, we have also an interaction term
(Resp. time * Strat. uncert.). In the second / third regressions we consider
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Figure 5: Cumulative distribution function of response times of withdrawal
decisions with strategic uncertainty
cases without / with strategic uncertainty.
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled data Strategic Certainty Strategic Uncertainty
VARIABLES Marginal effects Marginal effects Marginal effects
Response time 0.00242*** 0.000111 -0.000443
(0.000789) (8.93e-05) (0.00161)
Strat. uncert. 0.241***
(0.0728)
Resp. time x Strat. uncer. -0.00262**
(0.00106)
Cognitive abilities -0.0111 0.00240 -0.0803
(0.0159) (0.00251) (0.0512)
Female 0.00629 0.00675 -0.0291
(0.0267) (0.00970) (0.0766)
Risk aversion -0.00302 0.000822 -0.0220
(0.0114) (0.00138) (0.0343)
History -0.145 -0.0314 -0.230
(0.106) (0.0212) (0.236)
Observations 367 209 158
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Regression analysis of the effect of response times on withdrawal deci-
sions with strategic certainty
The first column shows that when there is no strategic uncertainty, then
longer response time predicts worse decisions (that is, withdrawal). This is in
line with our hypothesis. Moreover, in the presence of strategic uncertainty
we observe that withdrawals are more likely. However, the interaction term is
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negative, indicating that longer response times correlate with better decisions
when there is strategic uncertainty, as conjectured in Hypothesis 2b. When
considering the effect of response time on the withdrawal decisions separately
for observations with and without strategic uncertainty, the sign of the effect is
of the expected direction, but we do not observe any significant effect. The rest
of the variables does not have a significant effect.
Overall, the sign of the effect of response time on the optimality of decisions
is always in line with our Hypothesis 2b and we also have in some cases statistical
significance.
Result 2b: In information sets with strategic uncertainty, there is weak
evidence that longer response times associate with better decisions. However,
when there is no strategic uncertainty and decisions are obvious, then we find
the opposite. Thus, we cannot reject Hypothesis 2b.
5 Conclusion
Our main objective in this paper was to see how response time affects decision-
making in a bank-run set up. The underlying game that we study experimen-
tally is a coordination game with two types, a sort of game in which the effect
of response time has not been investigated. Interestingly, the game has infor-
mation sets with and without dominant strategies and in the former set we may
distinguish also information sets with and without strategic uncertainty. This
richness in information sets allows us to study associations between the length
of decision and the difficulty / optimality of decision. More concretely, we posit
that decision is easier in information sets with a dominant strategy compared
to information sets without. Hence, we expect to see longer response times in
the latter set (Hypothesis 1a). Furthermore, in the former set we have clear
optimal choices, so we expect that there longer response time associates with
better decisions (Hypothesis 2a). Digging a level deeper, we conjecture that
decisions are easier when there is no strategic uncertainty, so we expect that
strategic uncertainty correlates positively with response time (Hypotesis 1b).
Last, we conjecture that when decisions are really easy due to the presence of
dominant strategy and the lack of strategic uncertainty, then response time does
not predict well optimal decisions, because longer response times may only sig-
nal confusion and as a consequence suboptimal choices. On the contrary, when
there is strategic uncertainty we expect response times to have explanatory
power regarding the optimality of decisions (Hypothesis 2b).
We find no evidence for Hypotheses 1a and 2a. We speculate that it may
be due to the fact that finding those optimal choices takes as long as forming
beliefs about the other participants’ choices and responding to those beliefs. We
find convinving support for Hypotheses 1b and 2b. Hence, similarly to Branas-
Garza et al. (2016) we find that the presence of strategic uncertainty is related
to longer response times. Moreover, we show that response time associates
positively / negatively with optimal decisions depending on the difficulty of the
decision.
Overall, we find some evidence that longer response times lead to better
decisions, but the important message of the paper is that it depends on the
nature of the decision. In fact, when choice is trivial (in information sets with
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a dominant strategy and without strategic uncertainty), then longer response
time associate with worse decisions, suggesting that longer response time is a
signal of confusion and the lack of understanding the underlying decision. We
find similar results with respect to the presence / absence of dominant strategy.
However, when considering strategic uncertainty, then indeed the length of re-
sponse time has predictive power. This is reassuring for the case of bank runs,
as bank runs often emerge as a bad equilibrium in a coordination game between
depositors. Our study shows that imposing a longer response time may lead to
better decisions, that is to avoid the bank run equilibrium. The ensuing policy
recommendation is clear: imposing time to think about withdrawal decisions in
form of deposit freezes may help to curb the spread of bank runs.
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Appendix A: Instructions 16
Welcome to the experiment!
This experiment aims to study decision making; we are not interested in your
particular choices but are focusing on the average behavior of individuals. There-
fore, during the experiment, you will be treated anonymously. Neither the ex-
perimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your particular choices.
You will find the instructions on the computer screen explaining how the
experiment will unfold. The instructions are the same for all participants in the
laboratory and will be read aloud by the experimenters. It is important for you
to understand the experiment before starting, as the money that you will earn
will depend on your choices. You also have a copy of the instructions on your
table.
Should you have any problem during the experiment, please raise your hand
and remember that you are not allowed to speak with anyone except the exper-
imenter.
Number of rounds
This experiment has 18 rounds in total. The first 3 rounds are intended for
you to become familiar with the software. The remaining 15 rounds will be
used to determine your final payoff, so please be sure that you understand the
experiment before starting the 4th round. This understanding will help you to
earn more money.
Deposits
At the beginning of each round, you will be provided a certain amount of money
(80 ECUs) to be deposited in a bank. The bank in which you will invest your
money will be formed by 3 depositors: one of them is you, one is someone else
in this room and the third depositor is simulated by the computer. Therefore,
the bank in which you deposit your money will have 240 ECUs per round in
total.
Decisions and earnings
In principle, your decision involves choosing whether to withdraw your money
from the common bank in the first period or to wait until the second period,
considering that your earnings will depend not only on your choice but also on
other depositors’ choices. It is important that you know that the computer will
always withdraw its money; thus, your earnings in each round will depend only
on your choice and the choice of the other depositor in this room.
Specifically, if you both wait until the second period to withdraw your money,
you will receive 140 ECUs, corresponding to your initial investment (80 ECUs)
plus interest generated during the first period (during which you decided to
wait).
If only one of you withdraws the money, then the one who withdraws receives
100 ECUs (which is the same amount that the computer will take in this case).
16Instructions are originally in Spanish.
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In you decide to wait in the first year and 
withdraw in the second, the… 
 
Number of previous 
withdrawals 
 
If you withdraw the 
first year 
If you both wait and 
only the computer 
withdraws  
If, in addition to the 
computer, the other 
depositor withdraws 
0 100 140 60 
1 100 140 60 
2 40 Not applicable 60 
!
Figure 6:
The depositor who waits will receive 60 ECUs (corresponding to the remaining
amount in the bank after two withdrawals – 40 ECUs plus an additional 20
ECUs of interest).
Finally, it might be the case that both of you withdraw your money in the
first period. As a result, your earnings will depend on the available amount of
money in the bank and your position in line. Therefore, if you are at Position
1 or Position 2 in line and decide to withdraw, then you will receive 100 ECUs;
however, if you are the last one in line (Position 3), then only 40 ECUs remain
in the bank, and you will receive that amount.
Therefore, your payoffs can be summarized in the following table:
Please remember that the depositor simulated by the computer will always
withdraw its money in the first period.
Before beginning, please consider the following:
1. The person with whom you are linked will change in every round. As a
result, do not assume that you are going to play the entire game with the same
person.
2. You will always know your position in line, but this position might change
in each round. In particular, you have the same probabilities of being in Position
1, Position 2 or Position 3. The same is true for the computer’s position.
3. In each round, you will have different information about what the other
depositors at your bank have chosen. Therefore, in some cases, you will know
what has happened before you arrived at the bank (the number of wait and
withdrawal decisions), but in other cases, you will not have this information.
When you make your choice, you will also know whether someone else will
observe your action. It may be in your interest to consider this information
when making your decision. This information will appear on the left-hand side
of the computer screen.
E.g.: You are in Position 1. The depositors in Position 2 and Position 3
will observe your action.
E.g.: You are in Position 2. The depositor in Position 1 has chosen to wait.
The depositor in Position 3 will not observe your action.
On the right-hand side of your screen, a small graph shows with whom you
are linked (that is, the person whom you observe and who will observe you). If
there is no link between two depositors, then the text on the screen indicates
that the depositor who decides later cannot observe the action of the other
depositor. The symbol ”?” indicates that you do not know whether the other
two depositors are linked.
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Final payoff
When the experiment ends, we randomly choose one of the 15 rounds and pay
you according to the earnings from that round. We convert your earnings in
that round at a rate 10 ECUs = 1 euro.
We will now start with the first three rounds. At the end of these three
rounds, you can ask any questions to ensure that you understand the procedure.
If you have any doubts after the first three rounds, please raise your hand and
remain silent. You will be attended by the experimenters as soon as possible.
Talking is not allowed during this experiment.
25
